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LOAN PARTICIPATION AGREEMENTS AS SECURITIES:
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE SECURITIES ACT
OF 1933 AND THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
The use of multibank financing has increased greatly in recent
years." Because of the cost and complexity of many financial ven-
tures, a single bank may be unable or unwilling to loan all the
funds required. One solution is the loan participation agreement,
in which participant banks purchase a share of a loan made by a
lead bank in return for a corresponding share of the borrower's
principal and interest payments.2 If the borrower defaults on the
loan, a participant bank may sue the lead bank for fraud alleging
that the loan participation agreement is a security under the Se-
curities Act of 19333 (the 1933 Act) or the Securities Exchange Act
of 19344 (the 1934 Act). Because lead bank liability is more proba-
ble under the Securities Acts than under the common law,
whether loan participation agreements are securities is a vital
1. See Note, The Colocotronis Dispute: When is a Loan Participation Share a Security?,
13 J. IN'L LAw & ECON. 165, 169 (1978).
2. For a discussion of loan participation agreements, see infra notes 6-21 and accompany-
ing text.
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a - 77aa (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
4. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a - 78kk (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
5. A plaintiff must show deceit to recover under the common law. Prosser describes the
elements of deceit as a false representation made by the defendant, knowledge or belief by
the defendant that the representation is false, an intention to have the plaintiff rely upon
the misrepresentation, justifiable reliance by the plaintiff, and damages from such reliance.
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 105 (4th ed. 1971). Moreover, the plaintiff
must be in privity with the defendant, and omissions of material fact are not actionable
unless the defendant has a duty to speak. Id. §§ 105-106.
Conversely, the Securities Acts do not require an intent to deceive in all cases. Aaron v.
SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 689-702 (1980). The Acts expressly cover material omissions. Securities
Act of 1933, §§ 11, 12, 17, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771, 77q (1976); Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
§ 10b, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1976). Additionally, the Acts relax the reliance, causation, and privity
elements. Shapiro v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir.
1974). Finally, the process provisions in a suit under the Securities Acts are more expansive
than under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Compare Securities Act of 1933, §§ 20, 22,
15 U.S.C. §§ 77t, 77v (1976) and Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 21, 27, 15 U.S.C. §§
78u, 78aa (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) with FED. R. Civ. P. 4(). See generally Hammett, Any
Promissory Note: The Obscene Security, A Search for the Non-Commercial Investment, 7
TEx. TECH. L. REv. 25, 30-36 (1975).
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question. This Note will examine the statutory and judicial defini-
tions of a security and will conclude that loan participation agree-
ments often are securities.
LOAN PARTICIPATIONS
In a loan participation, the lending or "lead" bank sells undi-
vided fractional interests in a loan to any number of "participat-
ing" banks.8 A loan participation is similar to a loan syndication in
that a group of banks provides funds to a borrower.7 In a loan syn-
dication, however, each bank signs the loan agreement with the
borrower and receives a note representing its share of the indebt-
edness, and thus has a separate and distinct legal relationship with
the borrower.' Conversely, in a loan participation, the lead bank
alone deals directly with the borrower and retains all the loan doc-
umentation, including the borrower's note representing the entire
amount borrowed. The participating banks are involved solely with
the lead bank and have no rights directly against the borrower.9
The lead bank negotiates the terms of the loan with the bor-
rower and concludes the lending agreement. To arrange the loan
participation, the lead bank prepares a "placement memorandum"
which sets forth the financial condition of the borrower. The lead
bank then solicits other banks' participation. The prospective par-
ticipants may not receive any information other than the place-
6. See generally V. DJLORENZO, W. SCHLICHTING, T. RicE & J. COOPER, BANKING LAw §
102.06 (1981) [hereinafter cited as DILoRENzo]; G. MUNN, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BANKING AND
FINANCE 572 (7th ed. 1973); Armstrong, The Developing Law of Participation Agreements,
50 J. COM. BANK LENDING 45 (1968); Thuleen, Survey of Practice and Procedure of Banks
in Taking Participations from Correspondent Banks, 50 J. CoM. BANK LENDING 10 (1968);
Note, Bank Loan Participations: The Affirmative Duty to Disclose under SEC Rule 10b-5,
27 SviAcusE L. REv. 807, 807-10 (1976).
Finance companies also may deal in loan participation agreements. See Comment, Bank
Loan Participations as Securities: Notes, Investment Contracts, and the Commercial/In-
vestment Dichotomy, 15 DuQ. L. REV. 261, 263 (1976-1977).
7. For a discussion of loan syndications, see generally DILORENZO, supra note 6, § 102.07;
Note, Liabilities of Lead Banks in Syndicated Loans under the Securities Acts, 58 B.U.L.
REv. 45, 45-47 (1978).
8. Note, supra note 7, at 45-46.
9. The lead bank is the only secured party in the loan agreement and is the sole payee of
the borrower's notes. The participating banks are not creditors of the borrower and "[u]pon
any default by [the borrower, the lead] alone, [has] the power to act respecting such default
or defaults." In re Yale Express Sys., Inc., 245 F. Supp. 790, 792 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
[Vol. 24:295
LOAN PARTICIPATION AGREEMENTS
ment memorandum until after they have accepted the offer to par-
ticipate. 10 For arranging the loan participation, the lead bank
receives an initial commitment fee from the borrower;11 addition-
ally, the lead bank charges the participant banks a fee for manag-
ing the loan and funneling funds and information from the bor-
rower to the participant banks. 2
Each participant bank receives a certificate as evidence of the
loan participation from the lead bank.'3 This document sets forth
the terms of the loan participation agreement, including a dis-
claimer of lead bank liability for the loan if the borrower defaults 4
and a provision that limits the lead bank's liability for any losses
arising from its mismanagement of the loan or the loan participa-
tion.15 The lead bank also may warrant the authenticity of any
documents it gives the participating banks.' 6
A bank may desire to sell participations in its loans for many
reasons. A prospective borrower may have requested more funds
than the bank has available, forcing the bank to seek other sources
of funds to satisfy the borrower. The bank may be at its legal lend-
ing limit to a single borrower and, absent a loan participation, una-
ble to make the loan.'7 A loan participation also spreads the risks
of default and may improve the liquidity of the lead bank." Addi-
tionally, a loan participation creates a mechanism for the lead
bank to raise additional funds in the future if needed by the bor-
10. United Am. Bank of Nashville v. Gunter, 620 F.2d 1108, 1112 (5th Cir. 1980).
11. The lead bank generally receives a commitment fee of at least .25% per annum of the
unused portion of the loan. Comment, The Qualification of Loan Participations as Securi-
ties - The Potential for Lead Bank Liability under Rule 10b-5 and Section 12(2): An
Impact with International Ramifications, 8 CAL. W. IN'L L. Rxv. 510, 512-13 (1978).
12. Id.
13. For examples of participation certificates, see Thuleen, supra note 6, at 19-23.
14. Id. at 17-18.
15. Issac, Loan Participations and the Securities Laws, 58 J. CoM. BANK LENDING 50, 50-
52 (1975); Thuleen, supra note 6, at 17.
16. Thuleen, supra note 6, at 12.
17. The total indebtedness of a national bank is limited statutorily to the amount of its
capital stock plus 50% of the unimpaired surplus fund, except for certain specified de-
mands. 12 U.S.C. § 82 (1976). The obligations of a national bank to a single person, copart-
nership, association, or corporation are limited to 10% of the bank's capital stock and 10%
of its unimpaired surplus fund. 12 U.S.C. § 84. A lead bank may avoid these limits by selling
loan participations because the cash of the participating banks supplements the lead bank's
assets. Note, supra note 1, at 172-73.
18. Simpson, Loan Participations: Pitfalls for Participants, 31 Bus. LAW. 1977 (1976).
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rower. Finally, the lead bank maintains an exclusive relationship
with the borrower in a loan participation instead of being on an
equal footing with other banks, as in a loan syndication. 19
Participating banks also benefit from a loan participation. A pro-
spective participant may wish to invest temporarily idle funds.
Loan participations also may be the only means by which smaller
regional banks can become involved in larger and potentially more
profitable financial ventures.2 0 A bank without the necessary ex-
pertise to evaluate a loan proposal in a certain area can purchase a
participation in the loan of a more knowledgeable bank.21 For all
parties loan participation agreements can be profitable ventures;
however, the potential liability is large, especially if the Securities
Acts cover the agreement.
LOAN PARTICIPATION AGREEMENTS AS SECURITIES
Both the 1933 and 1934 Acts define a security. Section 2(1) of
the 1933 Act states "unless the context otherwise requires [a secur-
ity is] any note. . . investment contract. . . or any participation
in ... any of the foregoing. '2 2 Thus, a participation in a security
19. Because the lead bank alone deals with the borrower in a loan participation agree-
ment, the lead bank is less likely to lose clients to other banks than in a loan syndication.
Participating banks generally do not contact the borrower at any time without the lead
bank's approval. Thuleen, supra note 6, at 13. A loan participation also is easier to manage.
The syndication agreement may require the lead bank to obtain the consent of the syndicate
members before taking action; in a loan participation, however, the lead bank generally con-
trols the participation. Note, supra note 1, at 173.
20. Many loan participations originate in the correspondent banking system in which a
"city" bank agrees to perform services such as check clearing for a "country" bank in return
for interbank deposits. J. CLARKE, H. BAILEY & R. YOUNG, BANK DEPosrrS AND COLLECTIONs
10 (4th ed. 1972). A participation sold by a "country" respondent to a "city" correspondent
is an "upstream" participation, and a participation from the correspondent bank to the re-
spondent bank is a "downstream" participation. Stivers, An Analysis of the Techniques
Utilized to Meet the Loan Participation Needs of a Correspondent Bank, 53 J. Com. BANK
LENDING 31 (1970).
21. One area in which a bank may lack expertise is international financing. For a discus-
sion of international loan participations and syndications, see Note, International Loan
Syndications, the Securities Acts, and the Duties of a Lead Bank, 64 VA. L. Rav. 897
(1978).
22. The 1933 Act states:
When used in this title, unless the context otherwise requires ... [a security
is]... any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebted-
ness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement,
collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transfer-
298
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also is a security. The definition of a security in section 3(a)(11) of
the 1934 Act is similar, but excludes notes which mature in nine
months or less.23 The 1933 Act exempts notes maturing in nine
months or less from the Act's registration requirements,24 but not
from any antifraud provisions.25 Under the 1934 Act's definition of
a security, however, notes maturing in nine months or less literally
are subject to neither the registration26 nor the antifraud2 7 provi-
sions of the 1934 Act because such notes are not securities. Despite
these differences, the United States Supreme Court stated that the
definitions of a security in both Acts are virtually identical and
should be interpreted similarly. 8
Loan participation agreements may be securities in one of three
ways. If the note underlying the loan participation is a security,
the loan participation agreement also is a security.29 The underly-
ing loan may constitute an investment contract and again any par-
able share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit
for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights,
or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a "security," or
any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate
for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase,
any of the foregoing.
Securities Act of 1933, § 2(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1976).
23. The 1934 Act states:
When used in this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires ... [t]he
term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, certifi-
cate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement or in any oil,
gas, or other mineral royalty or lease, any collateral-trust certificate, preor-
ganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract,
voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit, for a security, or in general, any
instrument commonly known as a "security;," or any certificate of interest or
participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, or warrant, or
right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing; but shall not include
currency or any note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker's acceptance which has
a maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine months, exclusive of
days of grace, or any renewal thereof the maturity of which is likewise limited.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1976).
24. Section 3(a)(3) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(3) (1976) exempts such notes from
the registration required under § 5 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1976).
25. The antifraud provisions of the 1933 Act include §§ 11, 12, 17, and 24. 15 U.S.C. 88
77k, 771, 77q, and 77x (1976).
26. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1976).
27. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1976).
28. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 335-36 (1967).
29. See infra notes 32-99 and accompanying text.
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ticipation in that loan is a security.30 Finally, the loan participation
agreement itself may be an investment contract, regardless of the
status of the underlying transaction.3 1 Not all loan participation
agreements qualify as securities under the judicially devised tests
for notes and investment contracts, but under certain circum-
stances, loan participation agreements are securities.
Notes Underlying Loan Participation Agreements As Securities
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit consid-
ered the question of whether a note underlying a loan participation
agreement is a security in Lehigh Valley Trust Co. v. Central Na-
tional Bank of Jacksonville.-2 A participant bank, Lehigh Valley,
sued the lead bank, Central, for alleged misstatements and omis-
sions of material facts in violation of Rule 10b-5s3 and the 1934
Act.3 4 Central argued that the loan participation agreement was
not a security and thus not subject to the restraints of the securi-
ties laws. The court rejected Central's argument, applying a literal
interpretation of the statutory definition of a security. Because the
definition included "any note," the court reasoned that the bor-
rower's note representing the underlying loan was a security.3 " The
court stated that "this definition has been literally read by the ju-
diciary to the extent that almost all notes are held to be securi-
30. See infra notes 100-65 and accompanying text.
31. Id.
32. 409 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1969).
33. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1980). Rule 10b-5 states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
34. 409 F.2d at 990. Lehigh Valley also alleged that Central's misstatements and omis-
sions constituted common law fraud under Florida law. The United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the decision of the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Florida in favor of Lehigh Valley on this issue. 409 F.2d at 993-94.
35. Id. at 992.
300 [Vol. 24:295
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ties." '' 8 The loan participation agreement itself was a security be-
cause it was a participation in a security, the note.37
The literal interpretation of a security in Lehigh Valley has not
been followed, and even the Fifth Circuit has adopted another ap-
proach.38 Courts seemingly did not believe that Congress intended
the Securities Acts to be as expansive as a literal reading would
indicate.3 9 Instead of a literal approach, courts have emphasized
the introductory phrase of the definitions of a security in both Se-
curities Acts-"unless the context otherwise requires," 4°-to re-
strict the definition of a security.4 1
Courts currently employ three tests to decide whether a note is a
security. The majority approach is the commercial/investment di-
chotomy which attempts to determine the commercial or invest-
ment context of the transaction represented by the note.4 2 Reason-
ing that Congress intended the Securities Acts to protect investors,
courts applying the commercial/investment dichotomy hold that
only investment notes are securities. The United States Court of
36. Id. at 991-92.
37. Id. at 992. The court found no precedent dealing with the statutory phrase "any cer-
tificate of interest or participation in... a security," but interpreted the phrase literally in
view of the Supreme Court's policy of broadly reading the statutory definition of a security
to effectuate the antifraud provisions of the 1934 Act. See SEC v. National Securities Inc.,
393 U.S. 453, 464-69 (1969); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 338 (1967).
The court also rejected Central's argument that Congress did not intend the Securities
Acts to cover transactions between financial institutions because neither Congress nor the
Securities and Exchange Commission had indicated that the unsophisticated and the un-
wary were the only wards of rule 10b-5; fraud also could be perpetrated upon powerful and
sophisticated investors. 409 F.2d at 992. The court noted that Lehigh Valley, although so-
phisticated, was a small-town bank and had to rely upon Central's representations concern-
ing the soundness of the loan participation. Id. at 993.
38. Belah v. First Nat'l Bank, 495 F.2d 1109 (5th Cir. 1974). See infra notes 52-55 and
accompanying text.
39. One commentator argued that the courts' dilemma arose "from an unwarranted re-
fusal to believe that Congress understood the English language when it wrote the federal
securities laws." Hammett, supra note 5, at 74.
40. Securities Act of 1933, § 2(1) 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1976); Securities Exchange Act of
1934, § 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1976).
41. See Hammett, supra note 5, at 74-75.
42. The United States Courts of Appeals for the Third, Fifth, Seventh, and Tenth Cir-
cuits employ the commercial/investment dichotomy. See, e.g., C.N.S. Enter. v. G & G.
Enter., 508 F.2d 1354, 1359-63 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975); Zabriskie v.
Lewis, 507 F.2d 546, 551-52 (10th Cir. 1974); Bellah v. First Nat'l Bank, 495 F.2d 1109,
1112-16 (5th Cir. 1974); Lino v. City Investing Co., 487 F.2d 689 (3d Cir. 1973).
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Appeals for the Ninth Circuit employs an analogous approach, the
risk capital test.4 If the note represents risk capital rather than
merely a risky loan, the note is considered a security. Finally, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, advocating
a strict reading of the statutory language, follows a literalist inter-
pretation.4 Unless a note falls within one of six specified excep-
tions, it presumptively is a security.
The Commercial/Investment Test
Under the commercial/investment dichotomy, only investment
notes are securities. The test developed from a decision in Lino v.
City Investing Co.45 by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit. Lino bought two "Franchise Sales Center Licensing
Agreements" from City Investing in return for cash and promis-
sory notes. Lino sued City Investing for misstatements regarding
the agreements, arguing that the promissory notes were securi-
ties.46 In rejecting Lino's argument, the court seized upon the in-
troductory phrase to the definitions of a security in both Securities
Acts, "unless the context otherwise requires. '47 Reasoning that the
phrase referred to the context of the transaction, the court held
that Congress intended some transactions to fall outside the Secur-
ities Acts even though literally within the statutory definitions.8
Lino made no public offering of the notes and City Investing did
not procure them for speculation, investment, or venture capital.
Due to the "commercial context" of this transaction49 the court
held that Lino's notes were not securities.50
Other courts followed the Third Circuit's rationale in examining
the context of the transaction to determine whether a note is a
43. Great W. Bank & Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d 1252 (9th Cir. 1976).
44. Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1138 (2d Cir. 1976).
45. 487 F.2d 689 (3d Cir. 1973).
46. Id. at 690-91.
47. Id. at 695.
48. Id. The court noted the Supreme Court's statement that "a thing may be within the
letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within
the intention of its makers." Id. (quoting Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S.
457, 459 (1892)).
49. 487 F.2d at 694-95.
50. Id. at 696.
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security.5 1 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit explicitly set forth the commercial/investment dichotomy in
Bellah v. First National Bank. 2 Stating that the 1934 Act "is for
the protection of investors and must be read accordingly," 53 the
court held that the Securities Act covered only investment, not
commercial, notes regardless of their maturity." Because the bank
loaned funds to the Bellahs merely to assist their business and not
to profit directly from its operation, the note was part of an ordi-
nary commercial transaction and not a security. 55
Courts have examined a number of factors to distinguish invest-
ment from commercial notes, including the manner in which the
notes were offered, the lender's reason for buying the notes, and
the use to which the borrower put the money.58 If the borrower
51. See, e.g., National Bank of Commerce v. All Am. Assurance Co., 583 F.2d 1295, 1301
(5th Cir. 1978); Zabriskie v. Lewis, 507 F.2d 546, 551 (10th Cir. 1974); SEC v. Continental
Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516, 524-25 (5th Cir. 1974).
52. 495 F.2d 1109, 1112 (5th Cir. 1974).
53. Id. at 1111 (quoting Zeller v. Bogue Elec. Mfg. Corp., 476 F.2d 795, 800 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 908 (1973)).
54. 495 F.2d at 1112. Thus, the exclusion for notes maturing in nine months or less was
effectively read out of the 1934 Act's definition of a security. See supra note 23 and accom-
panying text. In a later case, the Fifth Circuit admitted that such a conclusion might sur-
prise the drafters of the statute:
We realize that our holding today that the [1934] Act does not apply to com-
mercial notes of a longer duration than nine months, taken with the decisions
voiding the short-term exemption as to investment paper, virtually writes that
exemption out of the law ... [T]he investment or commercial nature of a
note entirely controls the applicability of the Act, depriving of all activity the
exemption based on maturity-length. The original scrivener of the definitional
section may well wonder what happened to his carefully drawn exemption on
the way to the courthouse, but if the judicial decisions do not properly reflect
the intent of Congress as to the coverage of the Act, only that body can prop-
erly rectify that situation at this point, if stare decisis is to apply and the Su-
preme Court does not make some definitive decision contrary to the presently
decided cases.
McClure v. First Nat'l Bank, 497 F.2d 490, 494-95 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 930
(1975).
55. Bellah v. First Nat'l Bank, 495 F.2d at 1113-14. The court based its holding on con-
gressional intent, stating that Congress did not intend securities laws "to render federal
judges the guardians of all beguiled makers or payees." Id. at 1114. Furthermore, requiring
registration of all commercial notes "inevitably [would] wreak havoc on the commercial pa-
per market." Id. Such notes, however, usually would be exempt from registration under the
private placement exemption. See Securities Act of 1933, § 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1976).
56. McClure v. First Nat'l Bank, 497 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 930
(1975).
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uses the money to promote a new enterprise"7 or rejuvenate a busi-
ness"8 the note may be considered an investment. If the money is
used for current business obligations, such as purchase of con-
sumer goods, the transaction probably is commercial.59 Another in-
dicator is the method of measuring rate of return. If the rate is
fixed, the note may be commercial; if the rate is tied to the success
of the business, the note may be an investment.60 Further, if the
transaction is one in which stock often is given, the note probably
is an investment."1 Despite these attempts to formulate guidelines,
no court has developed a single comprehensive test to distinguish
commercial from investment notes.62
57. Zabriskie v. Lewis, 507 F.2d 546, 551 (10th Cir. 1974).
58. SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516, 526-27 (5th Cir. 1974).
59. Id. at 526.
60. Id.
61. Comment, Commercial Notes and Definition of 'Security' Under Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934: A Note is a Note is a Note? 52 NEB. L. REV. 478, 501 (1973), cited in
Zabriskie v. Lewis, 507 F.2d 546, 551 (10th Cir. 1974).
62. A frequently cited Comment suggests six considerations to determine whether a note
is commercial or investment in nature: common expectation, use of the proceeds, risk, num-
ber of payees and dollar amount of transaction, time, and how the note is characterized on
financial statements. Comment, supra note 61, at 510-24.
The SEC defined commercial paper in SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-4412:
The legislative history of the (1933] Act makes clear that section 3(a)(3) ap-
plies only to prime quality negotiable commercial paper of a type not ordina-
rily purchased by the general public, that is, paper issued to facilitate well
recognized types of current operational business requirements and of a type
eligible for discounting by Federal Reserve banks.
SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-4412 (Sept. 29, 1961), 26 Fed. Reg. 9159 (1961) (consid-
ering the registration exemption under § 3(a)(3) of the 1933 Act). The United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit used this definition of the 1933 Act's registration exemp-
tion to explain the 1934 Act's definition of a security, which excludes short-term notes.
Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 463 F.2d 1075, 1078-81 (7th Cir), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009
(1972).
Other courts have held that the SEC Release applies only to the registration exemption
and has no effect on the antifraud provisions of the Securities Acts. See, e.g., Tri-County
State Bank v. Hertz, 418 F. Supp. 332, 339 (M.D. Pa. 1976). The SEC Release supports this
conclusion:
It should be emphasized that section 3(a)(3), if available, affords an exemption
only from the registration and prospectus requirements of section 5 of the
[1933] Act and that civil liabilities of section 12(2) of the Act and the anti-
fraud provisions of section 17 of the Act are still applicable.
SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-4412 (Sept. 29, 1961), 26 Fed. Reg. 9159 (1961). Courts
have given no reason .for using one Act's registration exemption to explain another Act's
definitional exclusion. See Sonnenschein, Federal Securities Law Coverage of Note Trans-
304
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The major problem with the commercial/investment dichotomy
is its lack of precision. Courts consider different factors in every
ease and no one factor is determinitive. Each case is decided on its
own facts, causing unpredictability and confusion. The line be-
tween commercial and investment notes often is hazy, because one
note may possess both commercial and investment characteris-
tics. 3 The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,
which employs the commercial/investment dichotomy, recognized
the test's shortcomings in C.N.S. Enterprises, Inc. v. G. & G. En-
terprises, Inc.64
In one sense every lender of money is an investor since he places
his money at risk in anticipation of a profit in the form of inter-
est. Also in a broad sense every investor lends his money to a
borrower who uses it for a price and is expected to return it one
day .... In between [the extreme cases] is a grey area which,
in the absence of further congressional indication of intent or
Supreme Court construction, has been and must be in the future
subjected to case-by-case treatment. 5
Another difficulty with the commercial/investment dichotomy is
the Supreme Court's indication that courts must interpret the Se-
curities Acts broadly to effect their remedial purpose.66 The Secur-
ities Acts cover diverse forms of financing and do not stop with the
ordinary and the commonplace. 67 The commercial/investment di-
chotomy, however, restricts the scope of the Securities Acts by de-
fining investment too narrowly. The Supreme Court has held that
an investment is a contribution of money to another to share in the
expectation that the other will make money through its use.68
Many notes, therefore, that are not investments under the com-
mercial/investment dichotomy satisfy the Supreme Court's defini-
tion of an investment.2
actions: The Antifraud Provisions, 35 Bus. LAw. 1567, 1574 (1980).
63. A note may have both investment and commercial characterisitics if it is a long-term
note arising out of a pre-existing customer relationship.
64. 50S F.2d 1354 (7th Cir)., cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975).
65. Id. at 1359.
66. SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 467 (1969).
67. SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943).
68. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946).
69. The Securities Acts protect not only investors, but also the capital market of the free
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Thus, under the commercial/investment dichotomy, the note un-
derlying a loan participation agreement may be a security if the
note is an investment note.70 The note is a security if it qualifies as
an investment or if the borrower uses the funds to promote a new
business, or construct or buy capital assets. Any participation in
that note also is a security. A note falling under the "commercial"
side of the dichotomy is not a security and is not governed by the
Securities Acts. 1
The Risk Capital Test
The risk capital test 72 attempts to distinguish between risk capi-
tal and a risky loan . A note is a security only if it represents risk
capital. Indebtedness made upon the reasonable assumption that it
will be repaid is a loan, while money put to the risk of the business
is capital.7 4 In Great Western Bank & Trust v. Kotz, 75 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit examined whether a
lending bank could recover under the Securities Acts for losses suf-
fered on an unsecured note received under a loan agreement. The
ultimate inquiry in this case was whether the lender contributed
risk capital subject to the managerial efforts of the borrower.76
enterprise system. United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 849 (1975). By deter-
mining only whether a note represents an investment and not its place in the capital mar-
ket, the commercial/investment dichotomy misconstrues congressional intent.
70. First Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. Mortgage Corp., 467 F. Supp. 943 (N.D. Ala. 1979),
aff'd, 650 F.2d 1376 (5th Cir. 1981), involved 20-year notes purchased by the lender to
finance apartment and hotel construction. In a transaction similar to a loan participation
agreement, the developer borrowed money for interim financing. The lender then sold the
loan package to First Federal while continuing to administer the loan. The court held that
the transaction was a sizeable business investment on the part of First Federal, and there-
fore the notes were securities. Id. at 950.
71. A loan participation in a commercial note, however, may be a security. See infra notes
100-86 and accompanying text.
72. The risk capital test originated in Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d
811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1961), in which the California Supreme Court held that
memberships in a country club were securities under California law. See also Hawaii
Comm'r of Sec. v. Hawaii Mkt. Center, 52 Hawaii 642, 485 P.2d 105 (1971); State ex rel.
Healy v. Consumer Bus. Sys., Inc., 5 Or. App. 19, 482 P.2d 549 (1971).
73. Great W. Bank & Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d 1252, 1257 (9th Cir. 1976).
74. Cuyana Realty Co. v. United States, 382 F.2d 298, 301 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
75. 532 F.2d 1252 (9th Cir. 1976).
76. Id. at 1257. The risk capital test includes an element of the Howey test for an invest-
ment contract* whether the funds are subject to the efforts of others. SEC v. W.J. Howey
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The court listed six factors that determine whether a note repre-
sents risk capital and thus is a security:" the length of time of the
obligation,7 8 collateralization,7 9 the form of the obligation,"0 cir-
cumstances of issuance,e" the relationship between the amount
borrowed and the size of the borrower's business, 82 and the con-
templated use of the proceeds.8 3 Applying these factors to the note,
the court concluded that it was not a security. The note matured
in ten months and the borrower had to maintain a checking ac-
count balance of at least $300,000 with Great Western which con-
stituted partial security. The note referred to the parties as "bor-
rower" and "lender," the form of a typical lending agreement.
Finally, Great Western restricted the borrower's use of the funds.8"
The court concluded that "[a] note given to a bank in the course of
a commercial financing transaction is not generally a security
within the meaning of the federal securities acts."8' 5
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit applied the risk cap-
ital test to a put letter, similar to a loan participation, in United
California Bank v. THC Financial Corp.8 The court admitted
that some notes underlying loan participation agreements were se-
curities under the risk capital test: "[Plarticipations or notes evi-
Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946). For a discussion of the Howey test, see infra notes 100-41.
77. 532 F.2d at 1257-58.
78. This factor is the most important; the longer the funds are used, the greater the risk.
Id.
79. The lender is more dependent upon the skills of the borrower of unsecured notes than
of secured notes. Id.
80. This factor assists in explaining the circumstances of the obligation's issue. Id.
81. If the note is issued to a large group rather than to a single party, the note is more
likely to be an investment. Id.
82. The larger the relative amount, the greater the risk to the lender. Id.
83. Under this factor, the court must determine whether the funds are for higher risk
enterprise formation or lower risk current financing. Id.
84. Id. at 1258-60.
85. Id. at 1260. The Supreme Court mentioned the risk capital test but refused to rule
upon its validity because that issue was not raised in the case. United Hous. Found., Inc. v.
Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 857 n.24. For another application of the risk capital test, see Amfac
Mort. Corp. v. Arizona Mall, Inc., 583 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1978).
86. 557 F.2d 1351 (9th Cir. 1977). Under the put letter, United California Bank agreed to
extend a $500,000 line of credit to Climate Company if THC Financial Corporation con-
sented to buy from United California Bank all the notes that Climate gave to secure the
loans. THC Financial then would have received an assignment of Climate's Hawaii receiv-
ables. For the text of the agreement, see id. at 1354 n.1.
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dencing 'risk capital', i.e., risk of nonpayment, are securities while
those evidencing 'risky loans' are not. '87 Thus, a note representing
risk capital and any participation therein are securities.
Although somewhat more specific than the commercial/invest-
ment dichotomy, the risk capital test suffers from similar infirmi-
ties. First, the test is not comprehensive, as evidenced by the court
in Kotz stating that it may consider other factors in other cases. 8
The test also lacks predictability and guidance as to its application
in individual cases. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit never indicated the level of risk required by the test
for a note to be a security and how the different factors interre-
lated. Additionally, the test fails to distinguish personal loans to
consumers from supposed "investment" transactions.8 9 Another
problem with the risk capital test is its suggestion that the status
of a note may depend upon the financial situation of the drawer,
because the risk of nonpayment increases in proportion to the
financial insecurity of the drawer.
The Literalist Test
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit em-
ploys a more literal approach to the issue of whether notes are se-
curities. Reasoning that the statutory language is clear, the court
initially presumes all notes are securities. In Exchange National
Bank of Chicago v. Touche Ross & Co.,90 the court held that a
broker's unsecured notes purchased by the bank were securities
under the 1934 Act. The court discussed and rejected the tests ad-
vanced by the other courts of appeals. According to the court,
neither the commercial/investment dichotomy nor the risk capital
test provided adequate standards for uniform application, because
both tests required applying a variety of ill-defined factors without
providing instructions as to relative weights.91
The court agreed with other circuits that the introductory
87. Id. at 1358.
88. 532 F.2d at 1258.
89. A personal loan still may qualify as a security under the risk capital test. Id. For a
discussion of factors that may characterize a personal loan as a security, see supra notes 78-
83 and accompanying text.
90. 544 F.2d 1126 (2d Cir. 1976).
91. Id. at 1137.
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phrase of both Securities Acts' definitions of a security, "unless the
context otherwise requires," limited the scope of the definitions.
Yet the court held that the phrase referred to the purposes under-
lying the Securities Acts, not the investment or commercial context
of the individual transactions.92
Although the Supreme Court, in United Housing Foundation,
Inc. v. Forman,9 3 advocated considering form over substance, the
Second Circuit in Exchange National Bank stated that in the note
context, "the best alternative now available may lie in greater re-
course to the statutory language."'" To exclude a note that literally
is covered by the Securities Acts from the Acts' requirements, a
party must show that the purpose of the Acts requires such an in-
terpretation. The court listed six instances in which the Acts' pur-
poses justified exclusion, 5 and reasoned that unless the note bears
"a strong family resemblance" 98 to one of the exceptions and has a
maturity exceeding nine months, the 1934 Act usually applies.
Under the literalist test, notes are securities more often than
92. Id. at 1139. The court stated that "the purposes of the registration and anti-fraud
provisions [of the Securities Acts] differ, thus altering the 'context' to be examined to deter-
mine whether the admonition 'unless the context otherwise requires' is to be applied." Id.
(emphasis added).
The Supreme Court suggested that the introductory phrase applies to the context of the
defined words in the statute. "Congress itself has cautioned that the same words may take
on a different coloration in different sections of the securities laws; both the 1933 and the
1934 Acts preface their lists of general definitions with the phrase 'unless the context other-
wise requires.'" SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 466 (1969). One commentator
argued that the "context" referred to is the context of the statute itself. "Congress at-
tempted to define critical terms in the statute; it did not delegate its definition-making
authority to litigants." Hammett, supra note 5, at 39. See also Sonnenschien, supra note 62,
at 1572.
Another commentator simply stated that "[r]easoning from 'unless the context otherwise
requires.. .' is an exercise in futility." Carter, Bank Loans and Bank Credit Agreements:
Federal Securities Laws Status, 93 BANMnG L.J. 1020, 1027 (1976).
93. United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 848-51 (1975).
94. 544 F.2d at 1137.
95. The exceptions are:
the note delivered in consumer financing, the note secured by a mortgage on a
home, the short-term note secured by a lien on a small business or some of its
assets, the note evidencing a "character" loan to a bank customer, short-term
notes secured by an assignment of accounts receivable, or a note which simply
formalizes an open-account debt incurred in the ordinary course of business.
Id. at 1138.
96. Id.
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under the other two tests. The vagaries of the commercial/invest-
ment dichotomy and the risk capital test preclude accurate predic-
tions concerning whether notes are securities. Those tests presume
exclusion from the Securities Acts unless the note represents an
investment or risk capital. Conversely, the literalist test presumes
that the Securities Acts apply to a note unless it falls within one of
the Exchange National Bank exceptions. If the note does not fit
an exception, it is a security, as is any participation therein.97
The literalist test possesses advantages that the commercial/in-
vestment dichotomy and the risk capital test lack. Because the lit-
eralist test expressly considers the purposes of the Securities Acts,
it should remain more faithful to the original congressional intent.
By including "any note," Congress intended that the Securities
Acts have broad application to effectuate their remedial pur-
poses.9 8 By restricting definitions of an investment or risk capital,
the courts instead have limited the coverage of the Securities Acts.
Only the literalist test avoids artificial contraction of the Securities
Acts by concentrating on the clear statutory definitions and not
basing its decisions upon such nebulous terms as "investment" and
"risk." Finally, the literalist test results in more consistent inter-
pretation of the Securities Acts because of its ease of application.
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia
summed up these advantages of the literalist approach, stating
that "the Second Circuit's approach is most consistent with the
language of the statute and Congressional intent and is by far the
easiest test to apply."' 9
In summary, a note underlying a loan participation agreement
97. Commercial Discount Corp. v. Lincoln First Commercial Corp., 445 F. Supp. 1263,
1265-68 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
98. United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 847-48 (1975); SEC v. Universal
Services Ass'n, 106 F.2d 232, 237 (7th Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 622 (1940); SEC v.
Crude Oil Corp. of Am., 93 F.2d 844, 846-47 (7th Cir. 1937); SEC v. Wickham, 12 F. Supp.
245, 247 (D. Minn. 1935).
99. SEC v. Diversified Indus., Inc., 465 F. Supp. 104, 110 (D.D.C. 1979). Some commenta-
tors contend that the enumeration of six transactions rebutting the presumption that long-
term notes are securities suffers from inflexibility. See, e.g., 30 VAN. L. REv. 110 (1977). See
also Coffey, The Economic Realities of a 'Security': Is There a More Meaningful Formula?,
18 W. REs. L. Rav. 367, 369 (1967). Enumeration is less flexible than a balancing of numer-
ous factors, but it allows for greater certainty and predictability. Additionally, as novel
types of transactions develop, the courts presumably will alter the list of enumerated trans-
actions to deal with changed circumstances.
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may constitute a security under any of the three tests. If the note
represents an investment, risk capital, or does not fall under one of
the Exchange National Bank exceptions, the note satisfies the
commercial/investment dichotomy, risk capital test, or literalist
test respectively. If the note is a security, any loan participation in
that note also is a security.
INVESTMENT CONTRACTS AS SECURITIES
Loan participation agreements may be securities if either the un-
derlying loan or the loan participation agreement itself is an in-
vestment contract. Both statutory definitions of a security include
investment contracts, 100 but neither the Securities Acts nor their
legislative histories defines an investment contract.10 1 In SEC v.
C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp.,102 the United States Supreme Court
first considered what constituted an investment contract. The
Court examined "what character the investment is given in com-
merce by the terms of the offer, the plan of distribution, and the
economic inducements held out to the prospect."1 0 3
Three years after Joiner, the Supreme Court provided a more
specific and less circular definition of an investment contract in
SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.104 In Howey, the SEC sought an injunction
against the sale of allegedly unregistered investment contracts.
The W.J. Howey Company owned a citrus grove and sold portions
to the public, offering a service contract to each buyer of a part of
the grove. The service contract was not mandatory, but the small
size of the individual holdings and the buyers' lack of knowledge
and equipment precluded most buyers from caring for their trees
themselves.10 5
Adopting the construction of "investment contract" in many
100. For the definition of a security under the 1933 Act, see supra note 22. For the defini-
tion of a security under the 1934 Act, see supra note 23.
101. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946). For the legislative histories of the
Securities Acts, see J. Eu NBERGFR & E. MAHA, LEGISLATV HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES
Acr OF 1933 MND SECURrrIS ExCMGE Aar OF 1934 (1973) [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATVE
HisToRY].
102. 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
103. Id. at 352-53.
104. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
105. Id. at 296.
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states' Blue Sky laws, 08 the Court in Howey defined an investment
contract as "a contract, transaction, or scheme whereby a person
invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to expect
profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party."107
Thus, an investment contract requires four elements: an invest-
ment of money, a common enterprise, and profits derived from the
efforts of the promoter or a third party. A transaction containing
these four elements is an investment contract and thus a security.
Elements of the Howey Test
Investment of Money
To satisfy the investment requirement of Howey, an investor
must give up "a specific consideration in return for a separable
financial interest with the characteristics of a security."105 The
consideration need not be money,109 although usually it is. Addi-
tionally, the Supreme Court indicated that investment must be the
main reason for the transaction; for example, working for a living
is not an investment in a pension plan.110
The courts have split over how to apply the investment element.
One commentator stated that courts often presuppose an invest-
ment because "[i]nvestment in the context of the federal securities
laws involves nothing more than the turnover of consideration for
the expectation of gain." 1 The United States Court of Appeals for
106. See generally State v. Gopher Tire & Rubber Co., 146 Minn. 52, 56, 177 N.W. 937,
938 (1920).
107. 328 U.S. at 298-99. The term "investment contract" had been used in state security
laws and defined by state courts. Thus, "[b]y including an investment contract within the
scope of § 2(1) of the Securities Act, Congress was using a term the meaning of which had
been crystallized by ... prior judicial interpretation." Id. at 298.
108. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 559 (1979).
109. SEC v. Addison, 194 F. Supp. 709, 722 (N.D. Tex. 1961) (involving a contribution of
labor). Several commentators have suggested that the requirements should be an investment
of money's worth. See, e.g., Coffey, supra note 99, at 376-413; Long, Definition of a Secur-
ity, 6 ST. MARY's L.J. 96 (1974); Long, An Attempt to Return "Investment Contracts" to
the Mainstream of Securities Regulation, 24 OKLA. L. REV. 135, 161-62 (1971).
110. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. at 560. "Looking at the economic
realities, it seems clear that an employee is selling his labor primarily to obtain a livelihood,
not making an investment." Id.
111. Deacon & Prendergast, Defining a 'Security' After the Forman Decision, 11 PAc.
L.J. 213, 228 n.43 (1980).
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the Ninth Circuit, in Hector v. Wiens,11 2 held that investment
"means only that the investor must commit his assets to the enter-
prise in such a manner as to subject himself to financial loss. ' 113
Some courts, however, apply the requirement more strictly, adopt-
ing the commercial/investment dichotomy""" and the risk capital
test "1 5 to determine whether a transaction involves an investment
for investment contract purposes.
Courts should not apply the investment element too strictly. The
Supreme Court in Howey held that an investment is a contribution
of money with the expectation of receiving profits from the efforts
of the promoter. 6 Such a definition indicates that a wide variety
of transactions are investments. To give effect to the remedial pur-
poses117 and broad scope1 8 of the Securities Acts, the courts can-
not insist upon an overly formalistic definition of an investment.
A bank loan may satisfy the investment element of the Howey
test depending upon the court's definition of investment. 9 If a
court merely requires a transfer of consideration, a bank loan
clearly satisfies this requirement. Bank loans also may satisfy the
commercial/investment dichotomy test and risk capital test of an
investment. If the loan is to promote a new business, to purchase
capital assets, or to rejuvenate a failing business the loan is an in-
vestment under the commercial/investment dichotomy test and
thus satisfies the investment element of Howey.120 A loan also
places the bank's funds at a risk of loss under the Ninth Circuit's
112. 533 F.2d 429 (9th Cir. 1976).
113. Id. at 432.
114. American Fletcher Mort. Co. v. United States Steel Credit Corp., 635 F.2d 1247,
1253-55 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981). See also Note, Bank Loan Partic-
ipations: the Affirmative Duty to Disclose under SEC Rule 10b-5, 27 SYRACUSE L. REV. 807
(1976); Note, Real Estate as Securities: Sales of Residential Sub-division Lots, 1979 WASH.
U.L.Q. 965, 977-81. For a discussion of the commercial/investment dichotomy, see supra
notes 45-71 and accompanying text.
115. Union Planters Nat'l Bank v. Commercial Credit Business Loans, Inc., 651 F.2d
1174, 1181-83 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 972 (1981). For a discussion of the risk
capital test, see supra notes 72-88 and accompanying text.
116. 328 U.S. at 299-300.
117. United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
118. See supra note 98.
119. See Hammett, supra note 5. See also supra notes 108-18 and accompanying text.
120. See supra notes 45-71 and accompanying text.
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definition of investment in Hector v. Wiens.121 A bank loan, there-
fore, often can satisfy the investment requirement of Howey.
A participant bank also makes an investment when purchasing a
participation interest.122 The making of a loan and the sale of a
participation in that loan are two separate transactions and must
not be confused. The loan participation may be an investment
even though the underlying loan is not.12 In fact, loans and loan
participations differ in many significant aspects. Because the lead
bank has superior access to information concerning the borrower,
the party providing the funds, in this case the participant bank, is
in an inferior position as to the lead bank, which is the reverse of a
normal loan transaction.1 24
The purchase of a loan participation may be an investment, be-
cause it is not a loan to either the borrower or the lead bank. The
participant bank has no legal rights against the borrower and thus
cannot have a debtor-creditor relationship typical of a loan with
the borrower.1 25 Because the terms of the loan participation agree-
ment limit whatever rights the participant bank may have against
the lead bank,1 26 the participant bank does not have a debtor-cred-
itor relationship even with the lead bank. The participant bank is
not making a loan, and therefore the bank is investing its funds.
121. 533 F.2d 429, 432 (9th Cir. 1976). See supra notes 112 & 113 and accompanying text.
122. NBI Mort. Inv. Corp. v. Chemical Bank, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FF. SEc. L.
REP. (CCH) T95,632 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
123. See United Cal. Bank v. THC Fin. Corp., 557 F.2d 1351, 1357 n.8 (9th Cir. 1977);
Robbins v. First Am. Bank, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. S.c. L. REP. (CCH) 98,240
(N.D. Va. 1981); Commercial Discount Corp. v. Lincoln First Commercial Corp., 445 F.
Supp. 1263, 1267 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Avenue State Bank v. Tourtelot, 379 F. Supp. 250, 254
(N.D. IMI. 1974). But see Provident Nat'l Bank v. Frankford Trust Co., 468 F. Supp. 448
(E.D. Pa. 1979).
124. Concurring in Great W. Bank & Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d 1252 (9th Cir. 1976), Judge
Wright stated that "[i]n an investment situation, the issuer has superior access to and con-
trol of information material to the investment decision." Id. at 1262 (Wright, J., concurring).
In a loan participation, the participant banks' information regarding the participation
originates with the lead bank. The lead bank therefore has superior access to and control of
information.
125. For a discussion of the rights of debtors and creditors, see J. MooRE, W. PHILLIPS &
R. D'AGosTrNo, DEBTons' AN CREDrrons' RIGHTS (5th ed. 1979).




Courts have adopted two interpretations of the common enter-
prise requirement. 127 In the "vertical" approach, the relationship
between the investor and the promoter is important; one investor
and one promoter may satisfy the common enterprise requirement.
Under the "horizontal" approach, the court examines the relation-
ship -among the investors and requires a pooling of the investors'
funds or a pro rata sharing of profits. The horizontal approach
thus demands a number of investors for a common enterprise.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
adopted the horizontal approach in Milnarik v. M-S Commodities,
Inc.128 The broker's clients holding a discretionary trading account
in commodities futures failed to show commonality because "the
success or failure of [the] other contracts had no direct impact on
the profitability of plaintiffs' contract."12 The court stated that
Howey required joint participation or a pooling of assets because
in Howey numerous investors participated, the corporation com-
mingled the investors' funds, and the investors expected their re-
turn from the operations of the entire citrus grove.13 0
The United States Courts of Appeal for the Fifth and Ninth Cir-
cuits expressly rejected the necessity of pooling for a common en-
terprise and employed the vertical approach. In SEC v. Glen W.
Turner Enterprises, Inc.,13 the Ninth Circuit defined a common
enterprise as "one in which the fortunes of the investor are inter-
woven with and dependent upon the efforts and success of those
seeking the investment or of third parties."'13 The Fifth Circuit
adopted the Ninth Circuit's definition and held that if the fortunes
of the investors are "inextricably tied" to the success of the ven-
127. See 43 Mo. L. Rav. 779, 783-89 (1978).
128. 457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972).
129. Id. at 276.
130. Id. at 279. Other cases employing the horizontal approach include Curran v. Merrill,
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 622 F.2d 216, 222 (6th Cir. 1980), af'd, 453 U.S. 925
(1982); Hirk v. Agri-Research Council, Inc., 561 F.2d 96, 101-02 (7th Cir. 1977); Sunshine
Kitchens v. Alanthus Corp., 403 F. Supp. 719, 721-22 (S.D. Fla. 1975); Arnold v. Bache &
Co., 377 F. Supp. 61, 64-65 (M.D. Pa. 1973).
131. 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973).
132. Id. at 482 n.7. The vertical approach also was used in El Khadem v. Equity Sec.
Corp., 494 F.2d 1224, 1229 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 900 (1974); Jones v. Interna-
tional Investors Inc., 429 F. Supp. 119, 123-24 (N.D. Ga. 1976).
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ture, the scheme is a common enterprise.13 "[T]hat an investor's
return is independent of that of other investors in the scheme is
not decisive."'1 3 4
Most courts adopt the vertical approach,'3 5 which represents the
better interpretation. Although Howey involved numerous inves-
tors, the Court did not require pooling, but emphasized instead the
promoter's control and management of the enterprise. The pro-
moters did pool the produce for marketing, but each investor re-
ceived a return based on the harvest from his individual plot.' 6
Another reason not to require pooling is that the Securities Acts
serve a remedial function, and the Acts must be interpreted
broadly to achieve their purpose. 37 If pooling were required, pro-
moters could evade the Securities Acts merely by separating each
individual's account from the others.
A court must consider the economic realities of a transaction and
disregard form for substance.'3 An arrangement between one pro-
moter and one investor may present all the dangers that the Secur-
ities Acts seek to prevent. 13 Instead of employing a mechanical
pooling requirement, courts should examine the vertical relation-
ship between an investor and the promoter to determine if the
venture is a common enterprise.
The loan arrangement between the bank and the borrower may
be a common enterprise under the vertical approach if the
financial interests of the parties are inextricably tied.' 40 Each party
133. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1974); SEC v. Koscot Inter-
planetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 478-79 (5th Cir. 1974).
134. 497 F.2d at 479.
135. See 43 Mo. L. REv. 779, 783 (1978). Other cases adopting the vertical approach in-
clude Hector v. Wiens, 533 F.2d 429, 433 (9th Cir. 1976); Continental Mktg. Corp. v. SEC,
387 F.2d 466 (10th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 905 (1968); SEC v. Brigadoon Scotch
Distrib., 388 F. Supp. 1288, 1291-92 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Maheu v. Reynolds & Co., 282 F.
Supp. 423, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). Professor Louis Loss wrote that "proof of some sort of
pooling arrangement among investors... helps, but it is not essential." 1 L. Loss, SECURI-
TiEs REGULATONS 489 (2d ed. 1961).
136. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. at 296.
137. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967).
138. United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. at 848 (quoting Tcherepnin v.
Knight, 389 U.S. at 336).
139. For a discussion of the intent of the Securities Acts, see LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 101. See also infra notes 166-68 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 131-35 and accompanying text.
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shares a common profit motive and desires that the loan be repaid.
The borrower's use of the money actually may provide the funds
with which he repays the loan. The success of the borrower flows to
the bank in the repayment of the loan.
If a court applied the horizontal approach, a bank loan would be
a common enterprise only if the loan involved more than one bank.
Under this approach, a loan from one bank to a borrower is never a
common enterprise. The vertical approach represents the better in-
terpretation of Howey because it carries out the purpose of the Se-
curities Acts.14 1 A bank loan therefore generally qualifies as a com-
mon enterprise under the vertical approach.
Loan participation agreements also constitute common enter-
prises between the participant bank and the lead bank. The par-
ticipant bank's fortunes are tied inextricably to the success of the
loan participation as required under the vertical interpretation. All
participant banks look to the lead bank for their profits. If the loan
participation fails, the participant banks lose their money. Loan
participation agreements are common enterprises even under the
horizontal approach, because the lead bank usually commingles the
funds provided by the participant banks, and the participant
banks receive pro rata shares of the principal and interest.'42
Profits
The Supreme Court defined profits in an investment contract as
"either capital appreciation resulting from the development of the
initial investment. . . or a participation in earnings resulting from
the use of investors' funds . ... ,,143Additionally, variable returns
related to the success of a business are profits.' 44 The Supreme
Court's definition of profits includes interest as a "participation in
earnings resulting from the use of investors' funds.""' 45 This defini-
tion, however, has been interpreted differently by various courts.' 46
141. See supra notes 131-39 and accompanying text.
142. See Note, supra note 1, at 179-80.
143. United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. at 852.
144. See SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202 (1967); SEC v. Variable Annu-
ity Life Ins. Co. of America, 359 U.S. 65 (1959); Manchester Bank v. Connecticut Bank &
Trust Co., 497 F. Supp. 1304, 1313 (D.N.H. 1980).
145. 421 U.S. at 852.
146. The courts are divided on the issue of whether interest constitutes profits for invest-
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An examination of the economic realities of commercial banking
indicates that interest should be considered profits for investment
contracts.147 Banks are not charitable institutions; they enter into a
transaction to make a profit in the form of interest. That these
profits are fixed by a rate of interest should not alter their status
as profits. An interest rate merely places a limit upon how much
profit the bank can receive. "[A] ceiling on the expected return
does not go to the question of whether profit was expected; rather,
it goes to the question of how much profit was expected. 1 4 The
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylva-
nia, in Provident National Bank v. Frankford Trust Co.,149 stated
that "profits in the form of a fixed return are no less profits as
envisioned by the Howey test. 1 50 The fairly secure nature of inter-
est compared with the uncertainty of a varied return based on a
business's success is irrelevant to a discussion of the existence, as
opposed to the amount, of profits. 51
Interest payments by the borrower to the lending bank in the
case of a bank loan and by the lead bank to the participant banks
in a loan participation agreement therefore satisfy the profit re-
quirement. Such a result recognizes economic realities, because a
bank would not loan the money or join the loan participation if it
did not expect to earn a profit.1 52
ment contracts. A slight majority of courts hold that interest does not constitute profits.
Cases holding that interest constitutes profits include El Khadem v. Equity Sec. Corp., 494
F.2d 1224, 1229 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 900 (1974); Los Angeles Trust Deed &
Mort. Exch. v. SEC, 285 F.2d 162, 168-72 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 919 (1961).
But see United Am. Bank v. Gunter, 620 F.2d 1109, 1117-18 (5th Cir. 1980); Canadian Im-
peral Bank of Commerce Trust Co. v. Fingland, 615 F.2d 465 (7th Cir. 1980); FBS Fin., Inc.
v. CleveTrust Realty Investors [1978 Transfer Binder], Fan SEC. L. RFs. (CCH) T96,341
(N.D. Ohio 1977).
147. See Hannan & Thomas, The Importance of Economic Reality and Risk in Defining
Federal Securities, 25 HASTINGs L.J. 219, 237-38 (1974); Note, supra note 6, at 814; Com-
ment, supra note 11, at 529-31.
148. Note, supra note 1, at 186. Some commentators merely assume that interest pay-
ments are profits. "[P]articipating banks undeniably join the syndication for profit." Note,
supra note 21, at 906.
149. 468 F. Supp. 448 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
150. Id. at 455.
151. 328 U.S. at 301. The Supreme Court stated that "it is immaterial whether the enter-
prise is speculative or non-speculative." Id.
152. One commentator stated that "the profit element follows the implied fact that a
reasonable expectation of profit accompanies the decision of a bank to join the lending syn-
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Solely from the Efforts of Others
The requirement that an investor in a true security arrangement
derive profits from the efforts of others, separates investors who
need the protection of the Securities Acts from those who can pro-
tect themselves through their control of the enterprise. Courts in
early cases strictly construed the word "solely" and held that if the
investor participated at all, beyond providing funds, the scheme
was not an investment contract. Such a result, however, was un-
duly harsh and presented promoters with an easy means to avoid
the sanctions of the Securities Acts.1 53
Emphasizing the remedial nature of the Securities Acts and the
Supreme Court's admonition that the definition of a security
should be flexible, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit expressly rejected a strict interpretation of the word
"solely." The test instead was "whether the efforts made by those
other than the investor are the undeniably significant ones, those
essential managerial efforts which affect the failure or success of
the enterprise." " The Supreme Court, in United Housing Foun-
dation, Inc. v. Forman, 55 discussed this interpretation but refused
to express a view because that precise issue was not raised.156 In
considering the Howey test, however, the Court left out the word
"solely" and restated this requirement as profits "to be derived
from the entreprenurial or managerial efforts of others.' 157 The
dicate." Comment, supra note 11, at 529.
153. See generally Comment, What is a Security? Howey, Turner Enterprises and
Franchise Agreements, 22 U. KAN. L. Rav. 55 (1973).
154. SEC v. Glen W. Turner Enter., 474 F.2d at 482. The Fifth Circuit also adopted this
interpretation, stating that "[a] literal application of the Howey test would frustrate the
remedial purposes of the Acts." SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d at 480. Accord
Jones v. International Investors Inc., 429 F. Supp. 119, 123-25 (N.D. Ga. 1976); NBI Mort-
gage Inv. Corp. v. Chemical Bank [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] Fan. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
95,632 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). The SEC followed this interpretation in SEC Securities Act Re-
lease No. 5211: "It must be emphasized that the assignment of nominal or limited responsi-
bilities to the participant does not negative the existence of an investment contract .. "
SEC Securities Act Release No. 5211 (Nov. 30, 1971), [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 178,446.
155. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
156. Id. at 852 n.16.
157. Id. at 852. The "others" need not be the promoter or someone controlled by him.
Continental Mkfg. Corp. v. SEC, 387 F.2d 466, 470-71 (10th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391
U.S. 905 (1968).
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critical factor, then, is the nature of the investor's participation. If
the investor makes substantial efforts, he cannot satisfy this re-
quirement. 158 Investors who participate in a substantial way can
protect themselves through their control over the transaction and
thus do not need the protection of the Securities Acts.
The degree of the lending bank's participation in the handling
and use of a loan is critical to the "efforts of others" require-
ment.159 If the bank merely loans the money and permits the bor-
rower to use it at his discretion, the bank receives profits from the
efforts of others. Generally, however, banks exercise greater control
over the use of their funds. Provisions in the loan agreement be-
tween the bank and the borrower may require bank approval for
certain transactions, the placement of a member of bank manage-
ment on the borrower's board of directors, or even bank interven-
tion in the borrower's business upon the occurrence of certain
specified events. 160 Under these circumstances, a bank loan would
not satisfy the "efforts of others" element of the Howey test.
In a loan participation, the lead bank is more than a conduit of
funds from the borrower to the participant banks, because the lead
bank structures the loan and promotes the loan participation. The
158. For cases in which the investor's participation prevented the scheme involved from
being an investment contract, see, e.g., Chapman v. Rudd Paint & Varnish Co., 409 F.2d
635, 641 (9th Cir. 1969); Wieboldt v. Metz, 355 F. Supp. 255, 260-61 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
The Supreme Court stated that the Howey test "in shorthand form, embodies the essen-
tial attributes that run through all of the Court's decisions defining a security." United
Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. at 852. This statement caused some commentators
to contend that the Howey test "is to be universally applicable to defining securities." Dea-
con & Prendergast, supra note 111, at 214.
Many courts, however, have rejected the universal applicability of Howey. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated that the Supreme Court "has never
suggested that the [Howey] test is to be invoked ritualistically whenever the existence of a
security is at issue. Instead, the Court has applied the Howey test when considerations per-
tinent to an investment contract applied to the instrument in question." Meason v. Bank of
Miami, 652 F.2d 542, 549 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1428 (1982). Various courts
apply other tests when considering securities in a context outside investment contracts. See,
e.g, Lincoln Nat'l Bank v. Herber, 604 F.2d 1038, 1042-45 (7th Cir. 1979) (applying the
commercial/investment dichotomy); United Cal. Bank v. THC Fin. Corp., 557 F.2d 1351,
1358-59 (9th Cir. 1977) (employing the risk capital test).
159. Provident Nat'l Bank v. Frankford Trust Co., 468 F. Supp. 448, 455 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
160. In Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Alabama Bank, 679 F.2d 242 (11th Cir. 1982), for
example, the bank conditioned credit to a corporation on a change in the corporation's man-
agement and ownership. Id. at 244.
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participant banks generally have no voice in the terms negotiated
by the lead bank with the borrower and often must rely exclusively
on the lead bank's information as to the credit-worthiness of the
borrower and the soundness of the loan participation. The decision
whether to participate, therefore, may depend totally upon the ef-
forts of the lead bank.6 1
The reliance of the participant banks upon the lead bank contin-
ues after the participant bank joins the loan participation. The
lead bank manages and administers the loan. The participant
banks have no relationship with the borrower and must rely upon
the lead bank for performance. The loan participation agreement,
however, may give the participant banks a larger role than merely
receiving payments from the lead bank. Participant banks possess-
ing rights or performing tasks essential to the success of the loan
participation do not satisfy the "efforts of others" requirement.
The allocation of control over the loan participation agreement
therefore controls whether the agreement is an investment
contract.
In NBI Mortgage Investment Corp. v. Chemical Bank,16 2 the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York considered whether a participation in a loan for building con-
struction was a security. The court rejected Chemical Bank's argu-
ment that the loan participation was the same as the underlying,
admittedly commercial loan: "This overlooks the distinction be-
tween self-effort and the efforts of others."' 63 The court held that
loan participation agreements may satisfy the first three elements
161. See supra notes 6-21 and accompanying text.
162. [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FEr. Sac. L. REP. (CCH) 95,632 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (NBI
I). In NBI I, the court denied defendant Chemical Bank's motion for partial summary judg-
ment to dismiss NBI's claim alleging violations of the Securities Acts' antifraud provisions.
The court noted that pretrial discovery was incomplete. Id. at 90,147.
Less than one year after NBI I, the court granted Chemical Bank's motion for summary
judgment [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FaD. Sac. L. RaP. (CCH) 96,066 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)
(NBI II). The court based its dismissal on the plaintiff's valid disclaimer of reliance con-
tained in the agreement. 96,066 at 91,801.
Numerous cases have held that a loan participation agreement "was, or could be a 'secur-
ity."' See, e.g., United Cal. Bank. v. THC Fin. Corp., 557 F.2d 1351 (9th Cir. 1977); Com-
mercial Discount Corp. v. Lincoln First Commercial Corp., 445 F. Supp. 1263 (S.D.N.Y.
1978); Crowell v. Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R.R., 373 F. Supp. 1303 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
163. [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. Sac. L. REP. (CCH) 95,632 at 90,147 (S.D.N.Y.
1976).
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of the Howey test,"" but that the allocation of control over the
loan participation varies in every case. Allocation of control be-
tween the lead bank and the participant banks is the key issue.16 5
In NBI Mortgage, the lead bank alone set up and managed the
loan participation, which therefore was an investment contract.
Thus, both bank loans and loan participation agreements may be
investment contracts under the Howey test. Loan participation
agreements, however, are more likely to be investment contracts
than are bank loans, because lending banks generally possess more
control over the use of their funds than participant banks have
over the loan participation. Bank loans often do not satisfy the
"efforts of others" requirement; nevertheless, if the bank loan is a
security, any participation in that loan also is a security.
In summary, loan participation agreements may constitute se-
curities under the Securities Acts. The underlying note may satisfy
any of the three court-devised tests to determine whether notes are
securities. Alternatively, the bank loan or the loan participation
agreement itself may be an investment contract under the Howey
test. If a loan participation agreement is a security, the banks then
must comply with the Securities Acts.
IMPLICATIONS OF CHARACTERIZING LOAN PARTICIPATION
AGREEMENTS AS SECURITIES
Considering loan participation agreements as securities serves
the purposes behind the Securities Acts. The Supreme Court
stated that "[tihe focus of the Acts is on the capital market of the
enterprise system." ' Loan participation agreements are one vehi-
164. Id. These elements are an investment of money, in a common enterprise, expecting
profits.
165. Id. at 90,148. See also 5 BANKING LAW § 102.06 (1981).
166. United House. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. at 849. The Senate Committee on
Banking and Currency stated:
The aim [of the 1933 Act] is to prevent further exploitation of the public by
the sale of unsound, fraudulent, and worthless securities through misrepresen-
tation; to place adequate and true information before the investors; to protect
honest enterprise, seeking capital by honest presentation, against the competi-
tion afforded by questionable securities offered to the public through crooked
promotion ....
S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933), quoted in SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc.,
497 F.2d 473, 479 n.9 (5th Cir. 1974). The Ninth Circuit stated that the purpose of the 1933
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cle for raising capital. Another purpose of the Securities Acts is the
protection of investors.16 7 In many ways, banks invest through loan
participation agreements, 16  but the common law does not provide
adequate protection to a defrauded participant bank., e The Secur-
ities Acts include stringent antifraud provisions without which
fraudulent lead banks may escape liability. Because loan participa-
tion agreements present dangers that the Securities Acts were en-
acted to prevent, namely disruption of capital markets and fraud
upon investors, application of the Acts to these agreements fur-
thers the purposes of the Acts.
Under the Securities Acts, issuers of securities generally must
register securities with the Securities and Exchange Commission. 17 0
Most loan participation agreements should be exempt from the re-
gistration requirement under the private placement exemption.1
If the lead bank and participant banks are in the same state, the
intrastate exemption from registration may apply.172 Loan partici-
pation agreements therefore usually can avoid the added cost and
Act was to "protect the American public from speculative or fraudulent schemes of promot-
ers." SEC v. Glen W. Turner Enter., 474 F.2d at 481.
167. Zeller v. Bogue Elec. Mfg. Corp., 476 F.2d 795, 800 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
908 (1973).
168. See supra notes 45-71 & 108-18 and accompanying text.
169. See supra note 5.
170. For the registration requirements, see Securities Act of 1933, § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e
(1976), and Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1976).
171. Securities Act of 1933, § 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1976) exempts from registration
"transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering." Id. The SEC interpreted the
exemption in Regulation D. 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251, 11,262-66 (1982) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. §§ 230.501-.506). As an accredited investor, as defined in 501(e) of Regulation D, a
participant bank satisfies the basic requirements for offerees. This exemption is limited to
sales involving no more than 35 purchasers. Id. at 11,266 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. §
230.506(b)(2)(i)). Loan participation agreements generally involve less than 35 participant
banks. For a discussion of Regulation D and the 35 purchaser limitation, see Note, Regula-
tion D: Coherent Exemptions for Small Businesses Under the Securities Act of 1933, 24
WM. & MARY L. REv. 121 (1982).
172. Securities Act of 1933, § 3(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(11) (1976). "Any security which is
part of an issue offered and sold only to persons resident within a single State or Territory,
where the issuer of such security is a person resident and doing business within or, if a
corporation, incorporated by and doing business within, such State or Territory." Id. An-
other possible exemption from registration for loan participation agreements is § 3(a)(2) of
the 1933 Act, which exempts "any security issued or guaranteed by any bank." 15 U.S.C. §
77(a)(2) (Supp. 1980). That exemption, however, may be limited to the bank's own securi-
ties. See 1 L. Loss, SacuRrriss REGULATION 564-65 (2d ed. 1961).
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burden of registration.
Although exempt from the registration requirements of the Se-
curities Acts, loan participation agreements still must comply with
the Acts' antifraud provisions. 17 These sections impose a duty of
disclosure when securities are offered or when parties trade on in-
side information. The lead bank first must disclose information
sufficient for prospective participant banks to decide intelligently
whether to participate. Such information includes the financial sta-
tus of the borrower, his credit history, any indications of future
trends in the borrower's business and in the industry as a whole,
and information concerning the lead bank's managerial ability.17'
The lead bank also may have to disclose any possible conflicts of
interest, including any debts that the borrower already owes to the
lead bank.175
A problem for the lead bank may arise under the disclosure of
inside information requirement. 176 The borrower may want some
information to remain confidential. The lead bank's failure to dis-
close such information could cause liability under Rule 10b-5,
which requires that a party with inside information either disclose
the information or refrain from trading in any transaction to which
the information is material.17 7 To avoid potential liability,1 7 8 a lead
bank should prepare a complete placement memorandum and per-
haps allow prospective participants access to its files.17 9
Although potential liability under Rule 10b-5 may increase the
costs of loan participation agreements, banks will continue to use
participations because of the magnitude of current financial de-
mands.180 A borrower would not want to establish numerous loans
with various banks, each with different terms. Additionally, a bank
173. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
174. See Note, supra note 6, at 825-26, 828.
175. For other examples of possible conflict8 of interest, see id. at 826-27.
176. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
976 (1969) (imposing a duty either to disclose inside information or refrain from trading).
177. Id.
178. A lead bank may structure the loan participation agreement so that it is not a secur-
ity; thus, Rule 10b-5 will not apply.
179. See Note, supra note 6, at 829-32 for possible means by which lead banks may avoid
liability under the Securities Acts.




would prefer that its customers not deal with other banks directly,
which would occur if the lead bank refused to organize a loan par-
ticipation. Finally, loan participation agreements are profitable for
both lead banks and participant banks.""1
In arranging a loan participation, lead banks may take several
steps to avoid liability.18 2 First, the lead bank can attempt to struc-
ture the loan participation agreement as a loan and not a security.
If the participant banks have meaningful managerial control, the
loan participation agreement does not satisfy the "efforts of
others" requirement for investment contracts. The lead bank also
may attempt to avoid loan participations in transactions in which
the underlying note may be a security. 18 3 Another method to avoid
liability under Rule 10b-5 would be to adequately disclose all ma-
terial facts, particularly through the placement memorandum sent
to prospective participant banks. If the lead bank does not desire
to disclose facts in writing, it can release the information in other
ways such as accompanying representatives of the participant
banks in visits to the borrower's plants and facilities.8
The Proposed American Law Institute Federal Securities Code
may provide greater certainty regarding loan participation agree-
ments. 85 In section 202(150)(A), the Code defines a security much
like the Securities Acts. 8 " The Code also lists exclusions from the
181. See supra notes 6-21 and accompanying text. A lead bank cannot avoid securities
considerations by organizing a loan syndication because the latter also may be a security.
See Note, supra note 7; Note, supra note 21.
182. See supra note 179.
183. See supra notes 32-99 and accompanying text.
184. See Thuleen, supra note 6, at 14. The lead bank should encourage the participant
banks to make their own investigations.
185. For the status of the proposed code, see Wall Street J., Oct. 8, 1981, at 31, col. 2.
186. FaznRAL Sacumrrms CODE § 202(150) (A) (Proposed Draft 1980). A security is:
a bond, debenture, note, evidence of indebtedness, share in a company.
(whether or not transferable or denominated "stock"), preorganization certifi-
cate or subscription, investment contract, certificate of interest or participation
in a profit-sharing agreement, collateral trust certificate, equipment trust cer-
tificate (including a conditional sale contract or similar interest or instrument
serving the same purpose), voting trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a
security, or fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, or,
in general, an interest or instrument commonly considered to be a "security,"
or a certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate
for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or buy or sell,
any of the foregoing.
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definition in section 202(150)(B),187 including a note on evidence of
indebtedness issued in a primarily mercantile or consumer transac-
tion not involving a distribution.""8 The Securities and Exchange
Commission proposed to amend section 202(150)(B) so that it
"does not exclude a participation in any of the items excluded
under it.""s The amendment "does not mean that every participa-
tion in a primarily mercantile or consumer note . . . is a security.
The participation simply is not excluded. The participation is a
security if it is an investment contract or comes within another of
the § 202(150)(A) [definition of security] phrases."190
The Code's specific mention of loan participations draws atten-
tion to their special attributes and emphasizes their potential char-
acterization as securities, even if the participation involves a con-
sumer or mercantile transaction. Additionally, the proposed
amendment requires a court to examine the underlying transaction
and the loan participation agreement separately and not to confuse
the two. The Code as amended, therefore, would provide greater
direction to courts grappling with loan participation
characterization.
Id.
187. Id. § 202 (150)(B). A security does not include:
(i) currency; (ii) a check (whether or not certified), draft, bill of exchange or
bank letter of credit; (iii) (except for purposes of part XV) a note or evidence
of indebtedness issued in a primarily mercantile or consumer, rather than in-
vestment, transaction not involving a distribution (see also sections 202(25)
and 302(11)); (iv) an interest in a deposit account with a bank (but not a par-
ticipation in such interests); (v) (except for purposes of parts XII and XIV) a
bank certificate of deposit that ranks on a parity in liquidation with an interest
in a deposit account with the bank; (vi) an insurance policy (including an en-
dowment policy) issued by a company within section 202 (76)(A); (vii) an an-
nuity contract (including an optional annuity contract) under which a com-
pany within section 202(76)(A) promises to pay one or more sums of money
that are fixed or vary in accordance with a cost-of-living index or on any other
basis specified by rule; (viii) a commodity contract (whether for present or fu-
ture delivery) or warrant or right to buy or sell such a contract; or (ix) the
interest of a mini-account client in a mini-account under advisement if section
814(c) is effective; but section 202(150)(B) does not exclude a participation in








Loan participation agreements often are securities under the Se-
curities Acts. The note underlying the loan participation may sat-
isfy any of the three tests determining whether notes are securi-
ties.191 Bank loans are investment contracts if they qualify under
the Howey test.192 If the underlying note or loan is a security, the
loan participation agreement also is a security. The loan participa-
tion agreement itself may be an investment contract even though
the underlying note is not a security. Loan participation agree-
ments generally satisfy the first three elements of the Howey test.
The structure of the loan participation, in allocating control be-
tween the lead bank and the participant banks, determines
whether the loan participation agreement also satisfies the fourth
element of the Howey test and is thus a security.1 93
The widely divergent judicial tests applied to notes and invest-
ment contracts have hampered the classification of loan participa-
tion agreements. Legislative clarification would be welcome. In-
deed, the proposed Federal 'Securities Code provides greater
certainty regarding loan participation agreements. Until the Code
or similar legislation becomes a reality, however, courts will apply
one of many tests on a case-by-case basis, resulting in continued
confusion and uncertainty for banks and investors.
J. THOMAS COOKSON
191. See supra notes 32-99 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 100-52 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 153-65 and accompanying text.
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